Abstract. In this article, we study how predator behavior influences the aggregation of prey into herds. Game-theoretic models of herd formation are developed based on different survival probabilities of solitary prey and prey that join the herd and on the predator's preference of what type of prey to search for. For an intentional predator that will only pursue its preferred type of prey, a single herd with no solitaries cannot emerge unless the herd acts as a prey refuge. If neither prey choice provides a refuge, it is shown that an equilibrium always exists where there are both types of prey and the predator does not always search for the same type of prey (i.e., a mixed equilibrium exists). On the other hand, if the predator is opportunistic in that it sometimes shifts to pursue the type of prey that is observed first, there may be a single herd equilibrium that does not act as a prey refuge when there is a high level of opportunistic behavior. For low opportunistic levels, a mixed equilibrium is again the only outcome. The evolutionary stability of each equilibrium is tested to see if it predicts the eventual herding behavior of prey in its corresponding model. Our analysis confirms that both predator and prey preferences (for herd or solitary) have strong effects on why prey aggregate. In particular, in our models, only the opportunistic predator can maintain all prey in a single herd that is under predation risk.
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that predator preferences influence the gregarious behavior of a prey species (i.e., whether prey should aggregate by joining a herd or be solitary by staying on their own). In particular, we will see that the expected distribution of these two types of prey behavior depends on whether the predator is ''intentional'' (i.e., at a given time, the predator will only attack the type of prey that is its current intention) or exhibits some level of ''opportunistic'' behavior (i.e., the predator will also attack observed non-preferred prey with a given probability).
There are many reasons individuals choose between being solitary or part of a group (Krause and Ruxton 2002) . One widely accepted explanation why prey form herds is as a defense against predation. For example, in a study by Hass and Valenzuela (2002) of white-nosed coatis populations, predation by large felids accounted for more than 50% of mortality of adult coatis. Predation rates were higher on solitary coatis than on coatis in a group, where the predation rate was inversely related to group size. Herd formation can decrease individual predation risk for several reasons such as the following: the ''dilution'' effect (Dehn 1990 ); the ''many eyes'' hypothesis (Treves 2000) ; by confusing predators (Smith and Warburton 1992) ; and by mounting a cooperative defense to fight off the predator (Garay 2009 ). That is, there is a trade-off between safety and danger in numbers (Brown and Kotler 2004) . In summary, we can claim that the individual prey's survival probability is dependent on whether the individual in question is solitary or in the herd.
All of the above effects assume individual prey are homogeneous in the sense that all solitary prey have the same quantitative advantages and disadvantages as do all prey in a herd. This is not always true. For instance, there is evidence that an individual's survival probability in the herd also depends on its position in a herd such as through the ''selfish-herd'' hypothesis (Hamilton 1971) . In the selfish herd, if there is no refuge nearby, the best possible shelter is to be behind another prey. Individuals try to reduce their predation risk at others' expense. (Hamilton's treatment already includes a dilution effect studied later by Dehn [1990] and considers the case where danger from predation is shared equally among prey in the herd.) We will not take into account such position effects in the herd. Instead, we assume that, on average, each individual spends the same amount of time in the danger zone, thus the average survival rate of each member of the herd is the same.
Manuscript received 28 January 2010; accepted 27 May 2010; final version received 8 July 2010. Corresponding Editor: B. P. On the other hand, the above literature mostly ignores the effect of different predator behaviors. In the next section, where the predator is intentional, our model predicts that either all prey should be of one type and the predator searches only for the other type of prey (i.e., one type of prey acts as a refuge) or else there is a completely mixed equilibrium strategy. At this latter equilibrium, there are some solitary prey as well as some in the herd and the predator does not pursue only one type of prey (these equilibria were the focus of the general predator-prey two-habitat selection game introduced by Hugie and Dill [1994] ). In particular, when the predator is intentional, there is no equilibrium, as in Hamilton (1971) where all prey are in the herd and the predator searches only for the herd. On the other hand, when the predator is opportunistic (see Opportunistic predators), an equilibrium such as Hamilton's is possible (a completely mixed equilibrium is also possible for low levels of opportunism). Our results and their applications are discussed further in Conclusion.
In addition to finding the equilibria of these games, we are also interested in the effect of the predator's prey preference on the evolutionary outcome. To this end, the stability properties of all equilibria in Intentional predators and Opportunistic predators are characterized. Our main conclusions are that the herding behavior of prey cannot be understood without considering predator preferences and whether it behaves intentionally or opportunistically.
INTENTIONAL PREDATORS
In this section, we study the effects of intentional predators on the herding behavior of prey. For instance, it may be the case that the successful capture of a solitary prey requires different predation skills than those needed for prey in the herd. In such circumstances, the predator is typically ''intentional'' (Huggard 1993a) in that it does not alter its current aim if it encounters a prey it is not searching for. The analysis of this section also applies to predator-prey systems with partial separation of regions where prey congregate into the herd and where they are solitary. When there are several regions where the prey form herds (e.g., tree stands on adjacent mountains separated by grasslands), an intentional predator ignores solitary prey encountered when moving between these regions.
Alternatively, when prey exist in two separate habitats and their herding behavior depends solely on which habitat they are in, a predator is intentional by choosing the habitat in which to search for prey. In fact, herding behavior based on habitat choice is quite common among prey species. As examples, prey species for lions in the African savanna live in bigger herds in the open habitat (Hayward and Kerley 2005) and lions prefer to hunt prey in small herds (Scheel 1993) . Similarly, elk group size is typically greater in a grassland habitat than in conifer or pine stands and the wolves' predation success for elk depends on the landscape attributes of the different habitats (Huggard 1993a , b, Hebblewhite and Pletscher 2002 , Kunkel et al. 2004 , Hebblewhite et al. 2005 . Furthermore, avoidance of wolf predators is the most important factor in determining bison habitat selection and their herd size ).
In all these circumstances, predator success depends on the behavior of its prey. Since the fitness of both predator and prey depends on all of these choices, we have a two-species game based on conflicting interest (cf. Eshel et al. 2006) . The goal of this section is to predict the outcome of this conflict by determining the equilibrium strategies of the game and studying their stability. Each such equilibrium describes the expected proportion of prey in the herd as well as the proportion of time the predator devotes to each type of prey.
Although the model developed below assumes there is a single predator, it can also be based on a population of predators (of fixed number), each of whom searches for only one type of prey. The proportion of predators that search for the herd then corresponds to the predator strategy. That is, although we construct our model as if there were a single predator, our approach can be rephrased in terms of a population of such predators without changing the results.
In our model, those prey that choose a smaller herd size (including when these prey are on their own) are labeled as solitary prey. All solitary prey have one level of predation risk and all prey in the herd have another. Their only relevant individual distinguishing characteristic is whether they are part of the herd or solitary (e.g., their choice of habitat). These are the pure strategies of an individual prey. We assume that the fitness difference between these two types of prey depends solely on their predation risk (i.e., on their survival probability with respect to predation). In particular, since these assumptions mean that habitat determines herd size, we avoid the important question in ecology of what is the optimal herd size (Gerard et al. 2002) . This also avoids competition between prey of different types masking the effect of the predator's prey preference on the expected outcome.
Clearly, there is a trade-off between safety in numbers and the added food competition this entails. When predation pressure is high, prey density is far from their carrying capacity, which obviously weakens the effect of food competition. For instance, found that wolves have a big effect on the elk population (specifically, there was a 50-70% decline in elk population after wolf recolonization in Banff National Park, Alberta). Ungulate species often live primarily in areas rich in food and with high predation risk (Grignolio et al. 2007 ). Predation risk is also the main factor determining prey behavior in general models of habitat selection (Hugie and Dill 1994) .
Furthermore, we assume that each prey who reaches reproductive age has the same number of offspring, independent of how many times this individual encoun-tered and survived an attack by the predator. The predator also has two pure strategies; namely, to search for and attack a prey in the herd or a solitary prey. Its fitness is then the average number of prey caught (per unit time) less its cost of hunting. Let x . 0 be the total number of prey (i.e., the density of the prey population, which we assume is fixed) and p be the proportion of prey in the herd (corresponding to the average strategy of the prey population). That is, there are px prey in the herd and (1 -p)x solitary prey. Similarly, the predator's (mixed) strategy is given by the proportion s of its time spent searching for the herd and 1 À s searching for solitary prey.
Let f H be the probability per unit time that the predator, searching for the herd, observes the herd and catches an individual prey in it. Similarly, f S is the probability per unit time that the predator, searching for a solitary prey, observes one and catches it. These probabilities, f H and f S , are functions of the size of the herd ( px) and the number of solitary prey ((1 -p)x) respectively. We assume that these probabilities are positive if there are prey of the targeted type (e.g., f S is positive if there are solitary prey) and zero if not (since, for example, there is no probability that the predator will catch a solitary prey if there are none). At times, we also assume these are increasing functions. For example, the probability of observing some solitary prey increases as their number increases, since there is a higher chance the predator will meet such a prey. This, combined with a constant probability that the predator will successfully catch an observed solitary prey implies that f S is an increasing function of (1 -p)x.
From the above assumptions, the fitness of a prey in the herd can be measured by its survival probability per unit time (a commonly used approach in predation risk models (e.g., ). This is the function
since the probability this individual will be caught is the probability the predator catches a prey in the herd, sf H ( px), divided by the herd size (i.e., each prey in the herd is equally likely to be caught). The factor 1/( p 1 x) in Eq. 1 can be interpreted as the dilution effect of Dehn (1990) whereby more prey in the herd is to their individual advantage since each is then less likely to be caught. Similarly, the individual fitness of a solitary prey is
We will denote
and
and assume that the values F H (0) and F S (0) exist and are positive (see Appendix: Section 1). The predator's fitness depends on the probability per unit time of catching a prey (i.e., on f H ( px) or f S ([1 -p]x) as well as on the cost of hunting. Let C H and C S be the constant fitness costs of hunting for the herd and for solitary prey, respectively, per unit time (for instance, Kunkel et al. [2004] use the distance traveled per day as the cost of predation in the case of wolves in Montana). We denote the predator fitness when it searches only for prey in the herd (respectively, only for solitary prey) by V H (respectively, V S ). If we define the energy unit as the expected predator income from an average prey, then predator fitness from predation is the same as the catching probability. Thus,
The above strategy spaces and fitness functions define a two-species evolutionary game (Brown and Vincent 1992, Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) where fitness depends on the average strategies p and s of the prey population and of the predator. This predator-prey game can be viewed as a special case of two-species habitat selection models (Hugie and Dill 1994, Cressman et al. 2004 ) that focuses on the effect of adaptive predators on the herding behavior of prey. Its simplifying assumptions avoid several important issues for these general models such as the fitness effect of prey competition and the existence of prey refuges (Brown 1992 , Brown et al. 2001 , Cressman and Garay 2009 ). On the other hand, it clearly demonstrates that predator behavior must be taken into account in any evolutionary model that attempts to predict the formation of herds.
We are particularly interested in strategy pairs ( p*, s*) that correspond to stable equilibria (see Appendix: Section 2, for the notion of asymptotic stability used in this article) of this evolutionary game at fixed density x. To determine stability, a mechanism is needed to model how the proportions of p and of s evolve due to the fitnesses of the pure strategies. If W H . W S , we expect that prey will move to the herd (i.e., p will increase). Similarly, if V H . V S , the predator should increase the amount of time spent looking for the herd. As a behavioral dynamics, we use the following to describe how prey and predator change their behavior in response to fitness differences:
Here k and ' are positive and may depend on the state ( p, s, x) (see Appendix: Section 1). In the dynamic simulations ( Figs. 1 and 2 ), Eq. 5 is the replicator equation from evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) 
where a . 0 is a parameter related to the time-scale between behavioral evolution of the predator and the prey population. In these figures, strategy pairs are represented as points in the unit square f( p, s) j 0 p 1 and 0 s 1g. Equilibria can either occur on the boundary of the unit square or in its interior. These are summarized in the following two cases (whose detailed analyses are given in Appendix: Section 2) when f S and f H are increasing functions.
Case A1: boundary equilibrium
There is a stable boundary equilibrium if and only if either f S (x) , C S À C H or f H (x) , C H À C S . This is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and globally asymptotically stable under the behavioral dynamics (Eq. 5; Fig. 1A ). For instance, if f S (x) , C S À C H , then the probability the predator catches a solitary prey when all prey are solitary and the predator is searching for them is less than the cost of hunting for them. That is, hunting for solitary prey is more costly for predator fitness than the possible energy gain. Then ( p*, s*) ¼ (0, 1) is the only stable equilibrium.
In both cases, the predator hunts for one type of prey and all the prey choose the other behavior. Thus, the prey effectively have a behavioral refuge where they are all safe from predation when their density is fixed at x. In particular, when different prey behavior occurs in separate habitats (or the predator is intentional), there is no ESS (or stable equilibrium) as described by Hamilton (1971) whereby all prey are in the herd and the predator searches only for the herd.
Case A2: interior equilibrium
When there is no stable boundary equilibrium, the model generates exactly one interior equilibrium (i.e., a ( p*, s*) with 0 , p* , 1 and 0 , s* , 1). At this equilibrium, both prey strategies have the same fitness as do both predator strategies. That is, at ( p*, s*)
In terms of general predator-prey habitat selection models, this ( p*, s*) is often called an ideal free distribution (IFD; van Baalen and Sabelis 1999), generalizing the single-species concept developed by Fretwell and Lucas (1969) . As argued in Cressman et al. (2004; see also Krivan et al. 2008) , it is more appropriate to consider the conditions in Eq. 6 as necessary but not sufficient for an IFD since they do not guarantee evolutionary stability of this equilibrium. If hunting costs are the same (i.e., C H ¼ C S ), then at each interior equilibrium ( p*, s*), the predator spends exactly the same proportion of its time searching for the herd as the proportion of prey that are in the herd (i.e., s* ¼ p*). Intuitively, since the probability the predator is successful per unit time is the same at p* whether searching for the herd or solitary prey, the prey should distribute themselves in the same proportions as the searching time of the predator to equalize their probability of survival under these two strategies. To state this in an alternative way, the best strategy of the predator is to follow the prey's (mixed) strategy when hunting costs are the same.
On the other hand, if hunting costs are not equal (i.e., C H 6 ¼ C S ), then at ( p*, s*), the predator spends a higher proportion of its time searching for the prey with the smallest hunting cost than the proportion of this type of prey. For example, if C H , C S , then s* . p* as in Fig.  1B . These results, that the predator follows the prey behavior adjusted by its foraging efficiencies, is a general property of many predator-prey foraging games (e.g., Hugie and Dill 1994, Brown and Kotler 2004) .
The remaining question is whether the predator-prey system will evolve to this interior equilibrium (i.e., whether ( p*, s*) is stable under the behavioral dynamics [Eq. 5]). The Appendix, Section 2, proves the gametheoretical result that ( p*, s*) is stable if and only if p* is an ESS for the prey population. From the perspective of the prey population with predator strategy fixed at s*, p* is an ESS if, when one solitary prey changes to become a member of the herd, the individual probability of dying in the herd is then greater than a solitary's probability of dying (and so there is an incentive for this particular solitary individual to stay on its own).
If f H and f S are convex (i.e., concave up) for prey densities in each habitat smaller than at the equilibrium, then ( p*, s*) is stable (Fig. 1C) . In biological terms, convexity results when predator success increases faster with higher prey density. For example, this occurs when a larger herd increases the danger to each individual prey (e.g., when more prey increases the rate that the predator's searching time is shortened).
If f H and f S are always concave (i.e., there is safety in higher numbers of prey), then ( p*, s*) is unstable and the biological system spirals counterclockwise outward from ( p*, s*) towards the boundary of the strategy space. Depending on the form of the functions k and ', trajectories may approach a stable limit cycle or a heteroclinic orbit around the boundary of the unit square (as they do for the replicator equation of Fig.  1D ). Only in the exceptional circumstance when f H and f S are linear functions do we find the neutrally stable periodic cycling (Fig. 1B ) of predator and prey strategies as in Lett et al. (2004) . Now, consider the case where f H and f S are not always increasing functions. For instance, the predator's ability to observe the herd and catch an individual prey in it may decrease after the herd increases beyond a critical size due to an improved prey cooperative defense against the predator. Then ( p*, s*) is unstable if V H À V S is a decreasing function of p at this point. On the other hand, there must be at least one interior equilibrium ( p*, s*) where this fitness difference is increasing and this point is stable if and only if p* is an ESS of the prey population.
OPPORTUNISTIC PREDATORS
In this section, we analyze individual behavior from a game-theoretic perspective when the predator's diet choice is flexible. For instance, although lions prefer heavier prey weighing from 190 to 550 kg (Hayward and Kerley 2005) and also prefer prey in small herds (van Orsdol 1984 , Funston et al. 2001 , lions are opportunistic hunters and, without active searching, may capture prey that inadvertently wander close to them (Schaller 1972) . In addition, Huggard (1993a) distinguished ''random'' kills from ''intentional'' kills by wolves. While hunting, wolves move relatively quickly and directly toward one of a small number of grassland locations where elk herds (the ''intentional'' prey of wolves) are FIG. 1. Counterclockwise trajectories for the replicator equation (Eq. 5) with intentional predators (with a ¼ 1 and x ¼ 1, where a . 0 is a parameter related to the time-scale between behavioral evolution of the predator and the prey population and x . 0 is the total number of prey, i.e., the density of the prey population) and survival functions f H (u)
where f H is the probability per unit time that the predator, searching for the herd, observes the herd and catches an individual prey in it, f S is the probability per unit time that the predator, searching for a solitary prey, observes one and catches it, u is the density of the prey in the herd or of solitary prey [i.e., u ¼ p (proportion of prey in the herd) in f H (u) and u ¼ 1 À p in f S (u)] and a is a fixed parameter that determines the concavity of these two functions. These survival probabilities are both concave for 0 , a , 1 and both convex for a . predictably found. Deer (the ''random'' prey of wolves) are often captured after being flushed out by these wolves while traveling. To include the above mentioned random kills, we introduce the following mathematical model of this kind of ''opportunity'' when there is a single prey species. An opportunistic predator is one that changes its strategy (i.e., its original aim) with a certain probability r if it encounters prey that it is not searching for. The parameter r measures the predator's level of opportunism or its ''partial preference'' for prey (Garay and Mori 2010) that is often observed in experiments on diet composition (e.g., Rechten et al. 1983 ). Although our assumption that r is a fixed constant is clearly an oversimplification of this biological phenomenon, our analysis of this case highlights differences between the effects of opportunistic and intentional predators.
When r ¼ 0, the predator only makes intentional kills as in Intentional predators. At the other extreme, when r ¼ 1, the predator pursues the first prey it sees regardless of its own strategy, and so it only makes random kills. In this latter case, predator fitness will be independent of its strategy (i.e., there is no game from the predator perspective).
In this section, we avoid these two extremes and assume that there is a balance between random and intentional kills (i.e., 0 , r , 1). To concentrate on the changes in behavioral outcome due to the presence of opportunistic predators, we will only consider the case where there are equal costs of hunting solitary prey and 
, a ¼ 0.5 and r ¼ 0.9], two trajectories are shown, one converging to ( p*, s*) ¼ (1, 1) and the other to ( p*, s*) ¼ (0, 0), both of which are locally asymptotically stable. In the other three panels,
a -2 a . With r ¼ 0.4, there is an interior equilibrium that is (B) globally asymptotically stable for a ¼ 2 and (C) unstable for a ¼ 0.5. (D) There is a globally asymptotically stable boundary equilibrium with s* ¼ 1 when a ¼ 2 and r ¼ 0.7. The parameter r measures the predator's level of opportunism or its ''partial preference'' for prey. prey in the herd (i.e., C H ¼ C S ¼ C ). In fact, we take these costs as zero since our analysis does not depend on C. When there are few prey in the herd, we assume that their probability of being killed is the same as if they were solitary (see Appendix: Section 1). (This assumption, as well as equal hunting costs, are reasonable from biological considerations when there is a single habitat and hunting costs are based on predator traveling time per day.) Finally, assume that the functions f H ( px) and f S ((1 À p)x) introduced in Intentional Predators are increasing functions of px and (1 -p)x, respectively, and that they are either both concave or both convex. These functions have a slightly different meaning here. For example, f H ( px) is now the probability per unit time that the predator observes the herd and, if it decides to pursue the herd, catches an individual prey in it. Thus, the predator's fitness when its strategy is to search for the herd is
since it always pursues the herd when it is observed but only pursues an observed solitary prey with probability r. Similarly, the predator's fitness when searching for a solitary prey is
Furthermore, the survival probability of an individual prey who is in the herd or who is solitary is then given by W H ð p; s; xÞ ¼ 1 À ½s þ ð1 À sÞr f H ð pxÞ px and W S ð p; s; xÞ ¼ 1 À ½ð1 À sÞ þ sr f S ð½1 À pxÞ ð1 À pÞx respectively. Our two-species evolutionary game is specified by these four fitness functions and the fixed opportunistic level r. The stable equilibria of this game are summarized in three cases: pure-strategy equilibrium pairs; equilibria in the interior; and non pure-strategy pairs on the boundary. The detailed analyses are in Appendix: Section 3.
Case B1: pure strategy equilibrium Suppose that ( p*, s*) is a stable equilibrium under the dynamics (Eq. 5) with all prey in the herd (i.e., p* ¼ 1). Then the predator searches only for the herd (i.e., s* ¼ 1). In fact, this is an ESS if and only if, when all prey are in the herd, the probability that an individual prey there is killed by a predator searching for the herd is less than this probability if it left the herd (i.e., if it became solitary). That is, if and only if rF S ð0Þ . F H ðxÞ ð 7Þ
where F H and F S are defined in Eq. 3. Intuitively, the predator ensures it is to the prey's disadvantage to switch to solitary behavior by being opportunistic at a sufficiently high level r. With an opportunistic predator, this outcome matches Hamilton's (1971) result whereby the evolutionary outcome yields all prey in the herd and the predator searching only for the herd (Fig. 2A) . By the analogous argument, there is an ESS with all prey solitary and the predator searching only for solitaries if and only if rF H ð0Þ . F S ðxÞ:
Case B2: interior equilibrium
If an interior equilibrium ( p*, s*) exists, it is unique and p* is independent of the parameter r that measures the level of opportunistic behavior of the predator (i.e., p* has the same value as in Intentional predators). Also
and so s* . p* if and only if p* . 1/2. Thus, at an interior equilibrium, the predator will always spend a higher proportion of its time searching for the type of prey that is most abundant than the proportion of this type of prey. Furthermore, when an interior equilibrium ( p*, s*) exists and f H and f S are both convex, then ( p*, s*) is the only equilibrium (in particular, there are none on the boundary) and it is a locally asymptotically stable ESS (Fig. 2B) . On the other hand, when f H and f S are both concave, then ( p*, s*) is not an ESS and so unstable. Either the system consists of unstable outward spirals near this interior equilibrium (Fig. 2C) or (almost) all trajectories converge to one of the pure strategy equilibria found in Case B1. In particular, when an interior equilibrium exists, it is asymptotically stable if and only if the interior equilibrium for the intentional predator (with equal hunting costs) is asymptotically stable.
Case B3: boundary equilibrium
There is a stable boundary equilibrium that is not a pure strategy pair if and only if f H and f S are both convex and the level of predator opportunism r is sufficiently high so that s* given in Eq. 9 does not satisfy 0 , s* , 1 (Fig. 2D ). This equilibrium (p,ŝ) is unique and globally asymptotically stable. Here, the predator searches exclusively for the type of prey that would be most abundant if the predator were intentional and the prey adopt a mixed strategyp that makes this type of prey even more abundant.
CONCLUSION
Our models of prey herd formation, based on their survival probability under predation, clearly demonstrate that the evolutionary outcome depends to a large extent on the success of different predator behaviors. The classical theories on herd formation usually start with prey under attack by a predator. However, before this situation occurs, the predator must spend time and energy to find its prey after choosing the type of prey to search for (i.e., either the herd or solitary prey). Whenever predation success depends on the gregarious behavior of prey, we have an evolutionary game in which the counteracting interests of the ''players'' (prey and predator) affect each other's fitness. We analyze this game for intentional and for opportunistic predators, obtaining the following results.
First, the intentional predator will search exclusively for the type of prey with the smaller hunting cost when these costs are substantially different. Furthermore, if the predator searches for the herd in this case, all prey will choose to be solitary (or vice versa). In effect, being solitary corresponds to a prey refuge based on the cost of predation rather than on a location where predators cannot come.
On the other hand, there are only mixed equilibria ( p*, s*) when hunting costs for both types of prey are more similar. In fact, if hunting costs are the same, the intentional predator spends exactly the same proportion s* of its time searching for the herd as the proportion p* of prey that are in the herd (i.e., s* ¼ p*). That is, the predator follows the prey's mixed strategy when hunting costs are the same. For small differences in hunting costs, the predator spends a higher proportion of its time at ( p*, s*) searching for the prey with the smaller hunting cost than the proportion of this type of prey.
If the two types of prey are in separate habitats, our intentional prey model is an example of a predator-prey habitat selection game with prey fitness measured by survival. In contrast to the two-habitat model developed by Hugie and Dill (1994) where all equilibria are interior and evolutionarily stable, our interior equilibrium is stable (when predator success increases with higher prey density) if and only if p* is a single-species ESS of the prey population with predator behavior given by s*. These ESS conditions are related to the convexity of the predator fitness functions (in biological terms, convexity results when predator success increases faster with higher prey density).
Second, when the predator exhibits a high level r of opportunism, there are two possible stable equilibria corresponding to all prey of one type and the predator searching exclusively for this type. This occurs when the prey behavior is an ESS at the equilibrium and requires concave predator fitness functions. Thus, a stable outcome whereby all prey are in the herd and the predator searches only for the herd requires an opportunistic predator. Such equilibria (with all prey in a single herd or with no prey in a herd) are also found in the models of Hamilton (1971) and Eshel et al. (2006) , although they did not fully analyze the equilibrium's evolutionary stability.
On the other hand, for low levels of opportunistic behavior, there is no boundary equilibrium but an interior one does exist and it is stable if and only if there is a stable interior equilibrium of the model based on an intentional predator. The example studied by Hebblewhite and Pletscher (2002; see also Hebblewhite at al. 2005 ) agrees with our theoretical results. The wolves are clearly opportunistic in their wolf-elk predator-prey system. Moreover, in the pine stands habitat, elk use mixed herding behavior and the wolf hunts for both types of prey (i.e., the equilibrium is interior). For intermediate levels of opportunism when predator fitness functions are convex, there is a globally stable equilibrium on the boundary where prey adopt a mixed strategy but the predator only searches for the type of prey that is most abundant.
Our theoretical analysis has several important practical implications. First, in order for all prey to form a herd under predation risk, there needs to be an opportunistic predator. An intentional predator that spends any time searching for the herd in this situation will only look for this herd (and so a mutant prey, adopting the solitary strategy by leaving the herd, will be free from predation risk and have higher fitness). This implication is testable and agrees with the observed herding behavior of prey for wolves (Huggard 1993a) and lions (Schaller 1972) , which are both opportunistic. Second, the evolutionary stability of an equilibrium for our herd formation models does not require an ESS analysis of mutant predator behavior. Thus, predator behavior can be assumed fixed at its equilibrium value while the single-species ESS conditions for the prey are investigated, a result which is consistent with predator equilibrium behavior following the lead of the prey.
The results we obtain for the herding behavior of prey all rely on game-theoretic arguments based on individual fitness functions of prey and of the predator. In particular, existence of equilibria is then guaranteed for our models and their stability can be determined through an appropriate evolutionary analysis. 
